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I ABSTRACT 
This paper considers whether that branch of contempt known as 
scandalising the court, by an act or publication after trial or unrelated to any 
particular proceedings, would survive as 5 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
analysis. That is, whether scandalising the court is a reasonable limitation 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society on the right of freedom of 
expression affirmed ins 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
I approach this issue by considering the Ontario Court of Appeal's 
decision R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (41h) 213 . By a margin of three to two the 
court determined the offence of scandalising the court was not a justifiable 
limitation on the entrenched right of freedom of expression under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 1 I then consider whether the rationale of the 
majority judgrnents would be accepted in New Zealand, having particular regard 
to New Zealand's legal, social and cultural context, and the developments in this 
area of contempt in the intervening 15 years since the Kopyto judgment. In my 
view Kopyto will be a relevant consideration to an s 5 BORA analysis of 
scandalising the court, but the majority of the rationales given in Kopyto will not 
be adopted due to the passage of time and the need to consider the local 
circumstances of the publication when determining the offence. However in 
order for the offence to be BORA compliant the offence should be reformulated 
to include an additional mens rea element requiring proof of intent to undermine 
the administration of justice. 
A Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 13,634 words. 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss I , 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 
(Canada Act 1982 (UK), Sch B). 
3 
II AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPT BY SCANDALISING THE 
COURT 
That branch of contempt knowing as scandalising the court is the least 
invoked and perhaps the most controversial branch of the law of contempt. Its 
existence has been the topic of debate
2 since Lord Russell of Killoween CJ 
defined the offence in the seminal decision R v Gray. 
3 Its rationale has been 
described as speculative.4 It has been referred to as an archaic offence that 
should be abolished5 or never invoked.6 Despite the controversy contempt by 
scandalising the court presently exists in New Zealand. Whether it will continue 
to be so in light of ss 5 and 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
("BORA") is the focus of this paper. 
Contempt of court is a generic term that may take many forms.
7 A legal 
tool developed by the common law to maintain the respect and dignity of the 
court and its officers whose task it is to uphold and enforce the law, for without 
such respect the public faith in the administration of justice would be undermined 
and the law would fall into disrepute. 8 The public's confidence in the integrity of 
the justice system is crucial. 9 Lord Simon said in Attorney-General v Times 
Newspaper Limited1° that the rules embodied in the law of contempt are the 
means by which the law vindicates the public interest in the due administration 
of justice. Contempt does not exist to protect the private rights of individuals, 
parties to litigation or in order to shield a particular judge or a particular case 
from the criticism, as perhaps the expression "contempt of court" misleadingly 
suggests. 11 This point was made by Lord President Clyde in Johnson v Grant: 
12 
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Clive Walker "Scandalizing in the Eighties" (1985) 101 LQRev 359. 
R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36, 40. 
igel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin Th e Law of Contempt (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 
1996) 361. 
Clive Walker "Scandalizing in the Eighties" (1985) 101 LQRev 359,384. 
Attorney-General v Blomfield, Attorney-General v Giddis (1913) 33 ZLR 545,563 
(SC) Williams J. 
Attorney-General v Tim es Newspaper Limited [ 1974] AC 273, 307. 
Michael K Addo Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges (Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, England, 2000) 32. 
Gisborne Herald Company Limited v Solicitor-General [ 1995] 3 ZLR 563, 569 (CA). 
A ttorney-Ge11eral v Tim es Newspaper Limited [ 1974] AC 273, 315 (HL). 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon and Another [1978] 1 ZLR 225, 229 (CA) 
Richmond P. 
4 
The phrase "contempt of court" does not in the least describe the true of nature 
of the class of offence with which we are here concerned ... The offence 
consists in interfering with the administration of the law; in impeding and 
perverting the course of justice ... It is not the dignity of the Court which is 
offended - a petty and misleading view of the issues involved - it is the 
fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged. 
The offence of contempt is the only common law offence still existing in 
New Zealand, preserved bys 9 of the Crimes Act 1961. Similarly in Canada the 
Canadian Criminal Code preserves the common law power of contempt. In the 
United Kingdom, where the contempt power originated, the law of contempt is 
partly codified in the United Kingdom Contempt of Court Act 1981.
13 For those 
areas of contempt not covered by the 1981 Act, that includes scandalising the 
court, the common law is retained.
14 
The description and categorisation of contempt varies from authority to 
authority, reflecting Sir John Donaldson's MR remarks in Attorney-General v 
Newspaper Publishing Plc
15 that contempt is as diverse as are the means of 
interfering with the course of justice. Lord Russell of Killoween in R v Gray
16 
categorised contempt according to its effect. That is acts done or writing 
published that are calculated to lower the authority of the court or a judge. 
Secondly, acts or writing calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of 
justice or lawful process of the courts. In ew Zealand's first motion for 
committal for contempt for a scandalous publication, the then Chief Justice 
Stout17 distinguished between contempts in facie of the court and those ex facie 
of the court. That is contempts or acts done in court and those done outside the 
comi. Another classification of contempt distinguishes between contempt that 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Johnson v Grant 1923 SC 789, 790, cited with approval in Solicitor-General v Radio 
Avon and Another [1978] I ZLR 225, 229 (CA) Richmond P. 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK). 
CJ Miller Contempt of Co urt (3 ed, Oxford niversity Press, Oxford, 2000) 28. 
Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing Pie [1987] 3 All ER 276, 294 ( A). 
R v Gray [ 1900] 2 QB 36, 40. 
Attorney-General v Blomjield, Attorney-General v Giddis (1913) 33 ZLR 545,556 
(SC). 
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"interferes" with the court process or a particular court proceedings and contempt 
by "disobedience" with court orders or undertakings to the court. 
18 
Contempt is also classified into civil and criminal contempt. Civil 
contempt being generally described as the "disobedience" contempt and criminal 
contempt as the "interference" contempt. 
19 Sir John Donaldson MR in Attorney-
General v Newspaper Publishing Plc20 cast doubt on the value of distinguishing 
between civil and criminal contempt, preferring to use the general categorisations 
of disobedience and interference. The underlying rationale for all contempts is 
effectively the same - upholding the effective administration of justice. Both 
civil and criminal contempts require the same criminal standard of proof of 
beyond reasonable doubt, both have equivalent appeal rights, and a punitive 
element of punishment can be imposed for each. 
21 
A contempt that is of the "interfering" kind can be further divided 
between those acts or publications that interfere with particular proceedings and 
those contempts that interfere with the course of justice as a continuing process. 
In the later category there is no requirement that the acts or publication be linked 
to any particular proceedings. 22 It is the "interference" category of contempt that 
scandalising the court falls within. 
Scandalising the court is an act or the publication of material such as an 
accusation of bias or corruption on partiality against a judge of the court that 
interferes with the administration of justice by scandalising a court or judge. It 
was first described by Wilmont J in R v Almon2
3 as: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
... an impeachment of [the King's] wisdom and goodness in his choice of his 
judges, and excites in the minds of his people a general dissatisfaction with all 
judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them ... 
CJ Miller Contempt of Court (3 ed, Oxford University Press , Oxford, 2000) 567. 
Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin The Law of Contempt (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 
1996) 2. 
Attorney-General v Newspaper Publishing Pie [1987) 3 All ER 276, 294 (CA). 
Lowe and Sufrin, above, 3-4. 
CJ Miller Contempt of Court (3 ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 567. 
R v Almon (1765) Wilm 243, 255. 
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The most commonly cited definition of this branch of contempt is that 
formulated by Lord Russell ofKilloween in R v Gray,
24 as follows: 
Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the 
court into contempt or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court. 
In more modem times, Lord Diplock, in a judgment delivered for the 
Privy Council, summarised the offence as:
25 
Scandalising the court, is a convenient way of describing a publication which, 
although it does not relate to any specific case either past or pending or any 
specific judge, is a scunilous attack on the judiciary as a whole, which is 
calculated to undermine the authority of the courts and public confidence in 
the administration of justice. 
While scandalous conduct can occur in the face of the court, 
26 outside of 
the court, related or unrelated to particular proceedings, this paper focuses upon 
that sub-branch of scandalising that occurs after trial or unrelated to any 
proceedings at all. In these instances the ham1 caused by the scandalous act or 
publication relates solely to the impact of the act or publication upon the public's 
perception of the administration of justice. 
A Modern Examples of Scandalising 
Contempt by scandalising the court or judge can be difficult to 
conceptualise and brief reference to some recent examples are worth considering. 
The older authorities need to be treated with caution. What was once held to be a 
scurrilous abuse may not be viewed the same way today. 
An example of scandalising by scurrilous abuse of the Court and Judges 
1s a series of articles that appeared in the Oriental Daily News ("OD "), the 
largest circulating newspaper in Hong Kong, between December 1997 and 
January 1998.
27 The articles followed two court cases involving the OD and 
one of its subsidiaries. In the first case the OD received an adverse ruling from 
24 
25 
26 
27 
R v Gray [ 1900] 2 QB 36, 40. 
Choko/ingo v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago [1981] 1 All ER 244, 248 (
PC) . 
R v Wiseman [ 1969] NZLR 55 (CA). 
Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press Group Ltd and Others [1998] 2 HKC 62
7. 
7 
the Hong Kong Obscene Articles Tribunal ("OAT"), and in the second, an order 
to pay costs where nominal damages had been awarded to the ODN. In 
retaliation to what the ODN perceived to be two adverse rulings a series of 
articles were published that later formed the basis of the one charge of contempt 
by scandalising the court. The first of two articles, appearing on the san1e day, 
described the Judges of the Court of Appeal and the members of the OAT as 
"swinish white-skinned judges" and a "mangy yellow-skinned dogs", amongst 
other things, and that the OD was "determined to wipe them all out".
28 The 
second article went on to state: 
The crux of the problem is that there exists in the Hong Kong judicial sector a 
block of colonial remnants. They harbour animosity towards Oriental. The 
Obscene Articles Tribunal is attached to the judiciary system. It is merely a 
tail-wagging dog outside the judiciary. All of the adjudicators kept by the 
Tribunal are stupid men and woman who suffer from congenital mental 
retardation and have no common knowledge worth mentioning . . . The masters 
of these yellow-skinned canine adjudicators are none other than the likes of 
Rogers and Godfrey [JJ], the sheltering condoning judicial scum-bags and evil 
renmants of the British Hong Kong govemment.
29 
Several other articles were published in the following weeks repeating 
allegations of political bias and persecution, and continuing abusive offensive 
and scurrilous attacks with racial slurs upon the judiciary and OAT. The Court 
of Appeal summed up the campaign as follows: 
The vitrio lic campaign waged by the [ODN] on the Judiciary in general, and 
on Rogers J and Godfrey JA and the OAT in particular, is without parallel in 
modem times. The articles were not the spontaneous, unconsidered reactions 
of a disappointed litigant, but amount to a deliberate and persistent campaign 
of vilification of Hong Kong 's Judiciary.
30 
In addition to the articles published the OD also deployed a paparazzi to 
follow a High Court Judge for three days. This conduct was the basis of a 
28 
29 
30 
Th e Secreta,y for Justice v Th e Oriental Press Group Ltd and Others (23 June 1998) 
High Court of Hong Kong HC MP 407/1998 (Hong Kong HC) page 6 
<http:www.hklii.org/cgi-hk/i i/dis .pl/hk/eng-jud/HKCFI/1998 (last accessed 11 Sep-
2003) . 
Secreta,y for Justice v The Oriental Press Group limited and Others, above, page 6. 
Secreta,y for Justice v The Oriental Press Group Ltd and Others , above, page 21 . 
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second charge of contempt. The Chief Editor was convict
ed on the first charge 
and sentenced to imprisonment for four months. The pub
lishing company was 
convicted on both charges and fined HK$5 million. 
A publication that destroys public confidence in the adm
inistration of 
justice was illustrated in Fitzgibbon v Barker.
31 An application for committal of 
contempt for the Family Court of Australia, under s 112AP
(l) of the Family Law 
Act 1975, a statutory provision designed to preserve the co
mmon Jaw relating to 
contempt not involving an order of the court, was brought
 against the publisher 
and proprietor of the newspaper The Broadmeadows Observe
r. The article and 
accompanying photograph related to the protest of ten perso
ns against a two-year 
jail sentence imposed on a Mr Scwartsoff, father of four
, for breaches of the 
equivalent to a New Zealand protection order.
32 The article recorded the 
protestors' claim that Mr Scwartsoff was being punishe
d "only because he 
wanted to see his children".
33 The article also reported the protestors' view that 
the Family Court was biased against the non-custodial pa
rent, who was in the 
majority of cases the father. It was also reported that protestor
s had met with a 
local politician who had promised to "examine the matter".
34 
Considering the publication as a whole, that included the 
photograph of 
the protestors with their placards, the Court found the pub
lication gave readers 
the impression the Family Court penalised non-custodial pa
rents, mainly fathers, 
and has jailed a father merely because he wanted to see his
 children. This was a 
gross distortion of the truth. Mr Schwartsoff had been con
victed of 29 breaches 
of the protection order for ongoing harassment of his s
eparated wife over a 
period of months. The harassment included assaults (head-
butting and striking), 
intimidation and threats in public and in private places, ente
ring her home during 
the early hours of the morning, unwanted telephone calls 
and tail-gating. The 
Court found that the publication was a blatant distortion of 
the role of the Family 
Court, apart from the gross distortion of the findings of the
 Mr Schwartsoff case 
and: 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Fitzgibbon v Barker ( 1992) 111 FLR 19 (Austral Fam Ct). 
Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 14. 
Fitzgibbon v Barker, above, 192. 
Fitzgibbon v Barker, above, 193 . 
9 
. . . a statement calculated to bring the court into disrepute . . . they are 
calculated to lessen or discredit the authority and prestige of the court in the 
minds of reasonable people ... 
35 
It is one thing to criticise a court for what is seen as bad or unworkable 
interpretation of law, it is quite another thing to suggest that it jails fathers for 
no good reason at all.
36 
Finally, in Ahnee v DPP
37 the Privy Council considered an appeal from 
the Supreme Court of Mauritius upholding the convictions of the journalist, 
editor, and owner of the newspaper Le Mauricien that published a contemptuous 
article. The article stated that a Judge, whom had filed defamation proceedings 
against a politician, had improperly fixed the date for the hearing of his own 
defamation claim. The same Judge had also chosen the Judges to preside over 
his proceedings. The assigned Judges were liable to be called as witnesses. All 
of these allegations were wrong. The Supreme Court of Mauritius, upheld on 
appeal to the Privy Council, found that the article imputed improper motives to 
the Judge concerned that had been calculated to bring into contempt the 
administration of justice in Mauritius. 
B Legitimate Criticism 
While contempt acts as a constraint on criticism of the administration of 
justice the case law, both New Zealand
38 and overseas, have emphasised that the 
administration of justice is open to criticism, so long as the criticism is put 
forward fairly and honestly for a legitimate purpose and not for the purpose of 
injuring the system of justice.
39 The most quoted passage from the United 
Kingdom that expressly recognises the public's right to make fair and temperate 
criticism is Lord Atkins' opinion in Ambard v Attorney-General/or Trinidad and 
Tobago:
40 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Fitzgibbon v Barker, above, 201. 
Fitzgibbon v Barker, above, 201-202. 
A hnee v DPP [ 1999] 2 AC 294 (PC). 
A ttorney-Ceneral v Butler [ 1953] I ZLR 944, 948 (SC) Fair J. 
S0/icitor-Ce11eral v Radio Avon and A 11other [ 1978] 1 NZLR 225, 230 (CA) 
Richmond P. 
A ttomey-Ceneral v Trinidad and Tobago [ 1936] AC 322, 335 (P ). 
t 
The path of criticism is the public way: the wrong headed are pennitted to err 
therein: provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper 
motives to those taking part m the administration of justice, and are generally 
exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair 
the administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered 
virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and the respectful even 
though outspoken comments of ordinary men. 
The public's right to criticise the court was agam emphasised in 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn (No 2/
1 where Lord 
Denning MR stated: 
We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more 
important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. It is the right of 
every man, in parliament or out of it, in the press or over the broadcast, to 
make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. 
Those who comment can do faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. 
They can say that we are mistaken in our decisions, erroneous, whether they 
are subject to appeal or not. All that I ask is that those who criticise us 
remember that, from the nature of our office, we cannot reply to these 
criticisms. We cannot enter into the public controversy. Still less into 
political controversy. We must rely on our own conduct itself to be its own 
vindication. 
What is legitimate criticism and what publications will invoke the power 
of contempt reflects not only the need to uphold the administration of justice but 
contemporary social nom1s. What was held to be a scandalous publication at the 
tum of the twentieth century will not be viewed the same today where the 
judiciary is more accustomed to public criticism and society more accustomed 
and accepting of strong language.
42 For example in May 1992 the United 
Kingdom magazine Legal Business published a ranking order of the High Court 
judges, claimed to be the results of a survey amongst the legal profession. Of the 
Judge whom polled the lowest the editor of the magazine wrote: 
41 
42 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, exp. Blackbum (No 2) [1968) 2 All ER 319, 320 
(CA). 
igel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin The Law of Contempt (3 ed, Butterworths, London, 
1991) 343. 
II 
t 
... his conduct should ... disqualify him from being a High Court judge .. . 
share bloody mindedness and rudeness . . . his behaviour in court .. . 
undermines the very credibi;ity of English law ... his behaviour in court .. . 
undermines the very credibility of English law and he does a disservice to all 
involved in the legal process ... the behaviour of [X] is unacceptable ... [X] is 
an embarrassment to the bench.
43 
No action was taken in response to the article. The above passage is not 
that dissimilar from the scandalising article in R v Gray.
44 A case that further 
illustrates that scandalous statements will be determined in the context of the 
social norms of the day is Anissa Pty Ltd v Parsons,
45 an application for the 
conviction of the defendant for contempt. The defendant, a solicitor, was found 
to have said of the Judge whom had made the injunction that was served upon 
him by counsel for the applicant, in the presence of two police officers and a 
liquidator that" ... Justice Bench has got his hand on his dick".
46 It was held that 
the words spoken must be "judged by contemporary Australian standards". The 
words spoken were obscene but not scandalous and did not undermine the 
confidence of the administration of justice but rather the public's confidence in 
the defendant, as a solicitor.
47 
C Freedom of Expression and Scandalising the Court 
While the law of contempt has always been a restraint on freedom of 
expression the degree of the restraint is changing. Freedom of expression post 
entrenchment in the Canadian Charter is interpreted more broadly and with fewer 
restrictions than pre-charter.
48 The ew Zealand Court of Appeal in Moonen
49 
also adopted an expansive definition of freedom of expression, moving away 
from the reading down of the right as occurred in the Solicitor-General v Radio 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
igel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin The Law of Co11tempt (3'd ed, Butterworths, London, 
1996) 343. 
[1900] 2 QB 36, 40. 
Anissa Pty Ltd v Parsons ( on application of the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of 
Victoria) [1999] VSC 430 <http ://www.austlii.edu.ac/cgi-
bin/disp.pl/au/cases/vicNSC/1999/430.html> (last accessed 19 Sep 2003). 
A11issa Pty Ltd v Parsons, above, para 8. 
Anissa Pty Ltd v Parsons, above, para 22. 
R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 213, 224-225 Cory JA. 
Moone11 v Film and literature Board of Review [2000] 2 ZLR 9, 15 para [15] CA, 
Tipping J for the Court. 
12 
New Zealand Limited.so Freedom of expression clearly encompasses those acts 
or publications said to be scandalous and contemptuous and are therefore subject 
to s 5 of the BORA. 
As stated it is that sub-branch of contempt of scandalising the court, 
either after trial or directed at the system of justice as an on going process, that is 
the focus of this paper. In other branches of contempt the values and ideals 
competing with freedom of expression are generally more recognisable. For 
example the balancing of freedom of expression with pre-trial publicity that 
jeopardises an accused ' s right to a fair trial and the public interest in an accused 
standing trial. It is generally accepted that pre-trial publicity places at risk an 
accused standing trial and the limitation of freedom of expression is a deferment 
of that right until after the trial has concluded. s
1 Scandalous statements made in 
the fact of the court may undermine the court ' s ability to make an impartial 
judgment. The tension however between scandalous publications and a loss of 
public confidence in the administration of justice is more tenuous. This is 
perhaps one of the reasons why this branch of contempt has been so 
controversial. The focus of this paper is to consider how the competing ideals of 
maintaining the public confidence in the administration of justice and the 
public's right to criticise a fundamental public institution will be balanced under 
s 5 of the BORA. What is obvious from the recent New Zealand contempt cases 
is that the courts are attempting to formulate the law of contempt that balances 
the conflicting right so as to produce outcomes that fits the ew Zealand 
community's value and culture.s
2 
III NEW ZEALAND EXAMPLES OF SCANDALISING THE COURT 
In this section I summarise the New Zealand ' s cases of scandalising a 
judge or the administration of justice either after trial or directed at the justice 
50 
51 
52 
Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand limited [1994] I ZLR 48, 60 (TIC) Judgment 
of the Court. 
Gisborne Herald Co limited v Solicitor-Genera/ [1995) 3 ZLR 563 (CA). 
Jolm McGrath QC "Contempt and the Media : Constitutional Safeguard or State 
Censorship?" (1998) Z Law Rev 37 1,372. 
13 
system per se. There are relatively few cases in this narrow branch of cont
empt, 
both in New Zealand and abroad. As a result courts frequently c
onsider 
precedents from other jurisdictions. Whilst comparisons with cases abro
ad may 
be helpful there are limitations. Each case is very fact dependent and th
e "real 
risk" assessment is essentially a judicial value judgment, having regard to
 all the 
relevant circumstances of the publication, including the culture and va
lues of 
society and the climate of the times.
53 What may be a "real risk" on a small 
island such as Mauritius, where the administration of justice is
 more 
vulnerable,
54 may not be so in New Zealand. 
New Zealand cases are to a limited extent helpful in evaluating factors the 
court considers relevant to determining the cultural and social conte
xt and 
provides some insight into developments of New Zealand society. Th
ey also 
illustrate the restraint Law Officers have traditionally adopted when exe
rcising 
their discretion to bring committal proceedings and the court 
equally 
conservative response. 
New Zealand Supreme Court, after 72 years of its existence, first 
considered scandalising the court in Attorney-General v Blom.field, Atto
rney-
General v Geddis.
55 A weekly Auckland newspaper described as a "light and 
flippant periodical"
56 imputed to a Judge who had presided over a divorce suit, a 
bias towards the respondent induced by her sex and appearance. 
57 All five 
Judges wrote separate judgments arriving at a variety of conclusions. 
Those 
Judges that found scandalising the court still existed as an offence
58 held that the 
cartoon was coarse and insulting
59 but it would not shake the confidence of the 
people of Auckland in the Judge and obstrnct the administration of ju
stice.60 
Significant factors included that the Judge was Auckland based and his wo
rk was 
well known in the Auckland area through frequent newspaper publicatio
ns that 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Limited [1994] I ZLR 48 , 56 (CA
). 
Ahnee v DPP [1999] 2 AC 294,306 (PC). 
Attorney-General v Blomfield, Attorney-General v Geddis (191 3) 33 ZLR 
545 (SC). 
Attorney-General v Blomfield, Attorney-General v Geddis, above, 562. 
Attorney-General v Blomfield, A ttomey-General v Geddis, above, 561 . 
Stout CJ and Denniston J were both of the view that the Privy Coun
cil had stated in 
Mcleod v St A ubyn [1899] AC 549 that contempt of court by scandalising t
he court was 
extingui shed. 
Attorney-General v 8/omfield, Attorney-General v Geddis, above, 561. 
A 1torney-Ge11eral v Blomfield, Attorney-General v Geddis, above, 562. 
14 
I 
4 
were widely read by the public. The Court considered that the kind o
f person 
that the Judge was and the way he administered justice was a matter o
f public 
knowledge, and in such circumstances Williams J concluded: 
61 
... I fail to see how a single imputation of bias in an isolated case publi
shed, 
not in a serious journal but in a light and flippant periodical ... can obstru
ct the 
administration of justice. 
It is interesting to note that those Judges that accepted this branch o
f 
contempt continued to exist, post McLeod v St Aubyn
62
, expressed scepticism as 
to its utility. Justice Williams was of the view that scandalising a judge p
ost trial 
"resembles some antique weapon that will probably do more harm to th
ose who 
use it than those against whom it is used".
63 Justice Denniston's view was that 
this branch of contempt was wholly out of step with "the trend of modem
 ideas". 
In his view the judiciary must earn the public's respect and any steps to
 impose 
limits on public opinion will be counter-productive to that purpose. 
You cannot compel public respect for the administration of justice by flo
uting 
public opinions. Judges, like other public men, must rely upon their
 own 
conduct to inspire respect.
64 
In New Zealand's second case 29 years later, Attorney-General v 
Blundell and Others, Attorney-General v Glover
65 the Supreme Court considered 
whether a publication unrelated to any specific case undermined
 public 
confidence in the administration of justice. The newspapers, the Standa
rd and 
the Evening Post had both published passages of a speech made by the Pr
esident 
of the New Zealand Labour Party at its annual conference. The Presid
ent was 
reported as stating that "he had never known the Supreme Court to
 give a 
decision in favour of the workers where it could possibly avoid it" . He t
hen was 
reported as stating that "while he agreed that they could not get fair play 
from the 
Court of Arbitration he was of the opinion that unless they altered the b
asis and 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Attorney-General v 8/omjield, Allorney-General v Geddis, above, 562. 
Mcleod v St Aubyn [1899] AC 549. 
Attorney-General v 8/omjield, Allorney-Genera/ v Geddis, above, 563. 
Attorney-General v 8/omjield, Attorney-General v Geddis, above, 574, Den
niston J. 
Attorney-General v Blundell and Others, Attorney-General v Glover [ 1942] 
ZLR 287 
(SC), Myers SCJ. 
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the grouping of the workers they had to have a court to do the jo
b".66 No issue 
was taken as to the continued existence of this branch of contemp
t. Scandalising 
the court had been confirmed during the intervening
 years since 
Attorney-General v Blomfield, in Ambard v Attorney-General of T
rinidad and 
Tobago. 67 The Supreme Court held: 
In this case we can entertain no doubt that the passages comp
lained of are 
calculated to depreciate the authority of both the Supreme Court 
and the Court 
of Arbitration. The implication of the statements is that the worke
rs have been 
and are unable to obtain justice in those courts. Such statements a
re calculated 
to diminish the confidence of the public in the purity and impar
tiality of the 
administration of justice by the courts, and they are clearly 
contempts of 
court.68 
Counsel for each respondent admitted the contemptuous nature
 of this 
statement. The main question for the Court was the issue of pun
ishment. Both 
newspapers denied knowledge of an important pending indu
strial relations 
litigation before the Court of Appeal relating to the rights o
f workers and 
employers. The Court had regard to the full apologies both r
espondents had 
made and their expressions of regret. Consideration was also g
iven to the fact 
there was a dispute as to whether the President of the Labour P
arty had in fact 
made the reported statements. This dispute could not be resolve
d, the President 
not being a party to the contempt proceedings. The Court, in the
 absence of any 
ability to reconcile the evidential conflict, adopted the position m
ost favourable 
to the newspaper; that the statements had been made and w
ere accurately 
repo1ied. Fines of ten pounds per passage published by each n
ewspaper, plus 
costs, were imposed. 
New Zealand's third case, Attorney-General v Butler
69 also related to an 
industrial dispute. The Court of Arbitration had issued a new aw
ard. The new 
award, bar a few minor amendments, was of substantially the sam
e terms as the 
pre-existing award. The Secretary of the union concerned wrote 
a circular letter, 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Attorney-General v B/1111del/ and Others, Attorney-Genera/ v Glov
er, above, 287. 
Ambard v Attorney- General ofTri11idad a11d Tobago [1936] AC 3
22 (PC). 
A ttorney-Ge11 eral v Blundell and Others, Attorney-General v Glov
er, above, 289, 
Myers CJ. 
Attorney-General v Butler [ 1953] ZLR 944 (SC) Fair J. 
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distributed to the ten branches of the union, the Court of Arb
itration, the Minister 
of Justice, Secretary for Labour and Employment Departm
ent and the Acting 
Prime Minister. The letter, after referring to the "new a
ward", contained the 
following passages: 
I have stated previously, and repeat, that the Arbitration Co
w-t is the greatest 
and the most powerful factor in creating dissatisfaction w
ith the Arbitration 
Act. Recent decisions of the Cow-t of Arbitration, of wh
ich the present is 
typical, ruthlessly disregard the rights of employees to a fair
 standard of living 
and are important factors in creating in the minds of the w
orkers a sceptical 
regard of justice as administered by the cow-ts . 
It is unfortunate that an important Court of this kind, sho
uld appear, by its 
decisions, to ignore the elementary principles of equity and 
justice particularly 
at this fairly critical period when democracy and the rule of
 law as understood 
by English speaking people, is under severe strain. 
Whilst the Arbitration Court continues its present policy, i
t is the opinion of 
the writer, that there is no necessity for a communist party i
n New Zealand, as 
these obvious unjust decisions will more readil y fan the fla
mes of discontent 
that any propaganda which may be introduced into this co
untry by a foreign 
power .. . 
70 
The Court found the language of the letter was to insight d
isapproval of 
particular decisions, to shake the public's confidence in th
e Court and provoke 
discontent and ill feeling. It was held that contempt had been
 committed. It 
would seem from the judgment that upon concluding 
the criticism of the 
Arbitration Court was couched in language of abuse and inv
ective the offence of 
contempt was proved. This is despite the fact that the 
respondent had also 
confirmed his confidence in the system of arbitration as the
 preferred method of 
settling industrial disputes. o penalty other than an
 award of costs was 
imposed, that being viewed as sufficient to ensure future com
pliance. The Court 
accepted that if the same criticism had been expressed
 in more moderate 
language no offence would have been committed .
71 
70 
71 
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The fourth and last case of scandalising the administrati
on of justice, post 
hearing, is the most compelling case of the four. In S
olicitor-General v Radio 
Avon Limited and Others
72 a privately owned Christchurch radio station 
broadcasted a news item that stated that a Judge of the 
Supreme Court was at the 
centre of another closed court controversy and am
ongst other things had 
dismissed a criminal charge in a hearing behind closed 
doors ten days before. A 
few months prior, the son of the same Judge had been 
convicted of driving with 
excess breath alcohol. The son's conviction had gene
rated public controversy 
that included allegations of "preferential treatment" an
d "locked doors". It was 
clearly established that the Judge had had nothing
 to do with his son's 
prosecution other than arrange legal representation for h
im. The news editor had 
been unaware of the news item prior to its airing. Ha
ving heard it at home he 
arranged for its immediate withdrawal. In the Suprem
e Court the radio station 
and news editor were both convicted and fined $500 and
 $200 respectively. Both 
defendants unsuccessfully appealed their convictions
. The appeal j udgment 
records: 
... We are satisfied, and beyond reasonable doubt, th
at when the contents of 
the broadcast item are considered objectively, that is 
to say without regard to 
the actual intention of the sub-editor who rewrote the 
item and caused it to be 
published, the subject matter of the broadcast com
es clearly within Lord 
Russell's words, namely something published which 
was calculated to lower 
the authority of a judge in the court.
73 
This decision has been ew Zealand's first a
nd only extensive 
consideration of this branch of the law of contempt
. It firmly rejected the 
submission that the offence was obsolete (based on McL
eod v St Aubyn).
74 The 
Court of Appeal specified the elements of the offence, a
cknowledging the powers 
of contempt will only rarely be invoked. 
72 
73 
74 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon limited and Another [ 19
78) 1 NZLR 225 (CA) 
Richmond P. 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Limited and Another, ab
ove, 231. 
McLeod v St A ubyn [ 1899) AC 549. 
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Aside from two other instances of scandalising the
 court by filing 
documents with "scandalous" contents,
75 cases of this branch of contempt are 
rare. Whether this is due to the "chilling" effect the la
ws of contempt have had 
upon the media in New Zealand, or a high degree of tol
erance for criticism of the 
administration of justice, or a combination of factors
, it is difficult to know. 
With the last scandalising case, post hearing, being in 
1978 76 the New Zealand 
courts have yet to consider the impact of the BOR
A upon this branch of 
contempt. Although other branches of contempt ha
ve been considered post 
BORA the competing ideals of freedom of express
ion and maintaining the 
administration of justice are not comparable with other c
ontempts. 
IV KOPYTO- THE CANADIAN APPROACH 
A motion for committal for contempt by scandalising
 the court would 
require the New Zealand court to consider the Ontario 
Court of Appeal decision 
R v Kopyto.
77 The majority of the Court held that scandalising the c
ourt was 
inconsistent with the constitutionally guaranteed freedo
m of expression in s 2(b) 
of the Canadian Charter. Kopyto would be a significan
t consideration under s 5 
of the BORA. Kopyto was the basis of the submission t
o the High Court of Hong 
Kong in the Oriental Daily News case
78 that the common law offence was 
inconsistent with the protection of freedom of expressio
n provided by Article 16 
of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights.
79 It was also relied upon in Ah nee, 
0 before the 
Privy Counsel, for a similar submission based upon the
 Mauritius constitutional 
protection of freedom of speech.
81 In the most recent Australian case, R v Haser 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Re Wiseman [1969] ZLR 55 (CA), Solicitor-Genera/ v
 Robert Van der Kap (30 May 
1977) High Comt Hamilton M 155/97, Hammond J. 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon limited and Another [ 19
78] I ZLR 225 (CA) 
Richmond P. 
R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 213. 
Refer pages 7-9 above. 
Secreta,y for Justice v The Oriental Press Group limite
d and Others(23 June 1998) 
High Court of Hong Kong HC MP 407/1998 page 29 (H
ong Kong H ) 
<http:www.h.klii.org/cgi-hk/ii/dis.pl/hk/emg-jud/HKCFV
l 998 (last accessed 11 
September 2003). 
Refer pages 10 above. 
Aimee v DPP [1999] 2 AC 294 (PC). 
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and Kotabi,
82 counsel for the defendant unsuccessfully submitted
 that free speech 
was paramount to the common law powers of con
tempt. In all three cases the 
submission was unsuccessful. The purpose of 
this section is to outline the 
rationales of the three majorities and the join
t dissenting judgment. The 
applicability of the rationales to the s 5 of the BOR
A analysis will be considered 
in the next section of this paper. 
Mr Kopyto was a lawyer against whom contem
pt proceedings were 
brought following a statement he made to the pre
ss relating to an unfavorable 
judgment in a case where he had appeared as 
counsel for the unsuccessful 
litigant. Mr Kopyto's statement could not be co
nsidered to be a spontaneous 
response to the media request for his comment. 
He had been contacted the 
previous day by the press but declined to comme
nt until after he had read the 
decision. The following day, after considering th
e judgment, he contacted the 
reporter and stated: 
"This decision is a mockery of justice. It stinks to
 high hell. It says it is OK to 
break the law and you are immune so long as som
eone above you said to do it. 
Mr Dowson and I have lost face in the judicial sys
tem to render justice. 
We ' re wondering what is the point in appealing an
d continuing this charade of 
the courts in this country which are warped in fav
our of protecting the police. 
The courts and the RSMP are sticking so close to
gether you'd think they were 
put together with krazy glue."
83 
The Court was unanimous in allowing the appeal
 but divided as to the 
circumstances, if any, that scandalising the court m
ight be inconsistent with the 
constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of e
xpression. Justice Cory and 
Justice Goodman held the offence would be consis
tent with the Charter if it was 
redefined and limited in its scope.
84 Justice Boulden concluded that 
scandalising, however defined, was for an identifiab
le public interest.
85 The joint 
dissenting judgment of Justice Dubin and Justice 
Brooke, delivered by Justice 
82 
83 
84 
85 
R v Haser and Kotabi Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 443 . 
R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4'h) 213 , 219 . 
R v Kopyto , above, 241 and 263. 
R v Kopy to , above, 253 . 
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Dubin, concluded contempt was not protected
 by freedom of expression, the 
right of freedom of expression not being an abso
lute right. 
The Ontario Appeal Court's followed the R v 
Oaks86 approach to s l of 
the Canadian Charter, the equivalent to 5 of t
he BORA. Firstly, whether the 
offence of scandalising the court fell within 
the scope of the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression. The majo
rity held that scandalous conduct 
was constitutionally protected, the right of free
dom of expression being broadly 
defined.
87 Secondly, whether the objective that the measur
es responsible for the 
limit of freedom of expression are of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding 
the constitutional protection of freedom of e
xpression. Thirdly whether the 
restriction upon freedom of expression was c
onstitutionally permissible as a 
reasonable limitation prescribed by law and dem
onstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. The third step is referred t
o as the "proportionality test", of 
which there are three components. Firstly, w
hether the measures adopted are 
designed to met the objective identified. Sec
ondly, that the means chosen to 
achieve the identified objective impaired as
 little as possible freedom of 
expression. Finally, whether there was proport
ionality between the effect of the 
measure and the objective achieved.
88 
In Justice Cory's view the offence of scandalisi
ng the court was not a 
justifiable limitation on freedom of expressio
n because the offence was not 
carefully designed to achieve the objective in 
question, failing in two respects. 
Firstly the criminality of the offence was "a
ssumed" without actual proof
89 
Justice Cory adopted the American test that con
tempt of court will not be found 
unless it is established that the words in issu
e constitute a "real and present 
danger"
90 to the administration of justice, in a case pe
nding in the courts.
91 
Secondly, the offence should include proof th
at the accused intended (or was 
reckless) that his/her words would cause dis
repute to the administration of 
justice, and that the consequences of the words
 or conduct were serious and the 
6 
87 
88 
89 
90 
9 1 
R v Oaks [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
R v Kopy to, above, 229, 252. 
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R v Kopy to , above, 239-240. 
Bridges v State of California (1941 ) 3 14 US 252
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apprehended danger to the administration
 of justice was shown to be real, 
substantial and immediate.
92 
In my view, Justice Cory's conclusions we
re influenced by two factors. 
Firstly, his survey of the laws of contemp
t in other commonwealth countries 
(United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand)
 and the United States. At that time 
the United States was the only other coun
try that freedom of expression had 
constitutional or conventional protection. 
As a result the United States "clear 
and present danger" test was influential. 
93 In addition, Justice Cory was skeptical 
as to whether the effect of the scandalous
 words would in fact undermine or 
adversely affect the administration of justice
 in Canada. He said: 
. . . the courts are not fragile flowers that
 will wither in the hot heat of 
controversy. Rules of evidence, methods o
f procedure and means of review 
and appeal exist that go far to establishing
 a fair and equitable rule of law. 
The courts have functioned well and effici
ently in difficult times . They are 
well regarded in the community because th
ey merit respect. They need not 
fear criticism nor need they seek to sustain 
unnecessary barriers to complaints 
about their operations or decisions.
94 
In response to this skepticism a more stringe
nt test was formulated. 
Justice Goodman helpfully set out at the be
ginning of his judgrnent the 
pre-Charter offence of contempt: the uttera
nce of scurrilous remarks calculated 
(likely or intended) to bring the administratio
n of justice into disrepute. No proof 
that the administration of justice had in fa
ct been brought into disrepute was 
required. In his view the remarks of Mr Ko
pyto that alleged bias by the courts 
would have constituted an offence pre-Ch
arter.
95 Justice Goodman was in 
agreement with Justice Cory, that the offen
ce was not a proportional response 
and was not a reasonable limit on freedom o
f expression.
96 For the offence to be 
Charter compliant three additional elements 
were required. Firstly, proof that the 
words in issue were either an assertion of fa
cts recklessly made as to their truth, 
or knowingly false, or an opinion not hones
tly held. Secondly, the words must 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
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bring the administration of justice into disrep
ute in the mind of a reasonable 
person.
97 Finally, proof that the utterance had resulted in
 a clear and significant 
and imminent or present danger to the administr
ation of justice.
98 
Unlike Justice Cory's reformulated test that req
uired specific proof of the 
accused intent, Justice Goodman's focus was up
on the truthfulness of the facts or 
the honesty of the opinions expressed. He wa
s influenced by the fact that the 
same opinion expressed in crude, vulgar, impol
ite and acerbic language would be 
unlawful under the pre-existing test, but lawful 
if revised into a polite, temperate, 
scholarly opinion.
99 In his view, this result was unpalatable and h
onestly held 
opinions should be protected by freedom of exp
ression and not subject to the law 
of contempt. Like Justice Cory, he also adop
ted the United States "clear and 
present danger test" but he did not limit it to cas
es pending before the court. 
Justice Boulden, the third majority judgment, 
also accepted that had the 
offending occurred pre-Charter Mr Kopyto 
would have been convicted for 
contempt.
100 However, post-Charter, it was his view that
 the offence was 
unconstitutional, for reasons different to th
ose already stated. In Justice 
Houlden's view the offence went beyond w
hat was required to achieve the 
objective of maintaining the administration of j
ustice.
101 Freedom of expression 
should not be curtailed because of a scandalous
 publication. The public were not 
so gullible nor the courts so weak that criticism
 of the kind in issue would affect 
the administration of justice. In his view the offe
nce, however constituted, was 
simply not required. There was no longer any s
cope for its operation.
102 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
I feel confident that our judiciary and our
 courts are strong enough to 
withstand criticism after a case has been decid
ed no matter how outrageous or 
scurrilous that criticism may be. I fee l equally
 confident that the Canadian 
R v Kopy to , above, 263. 
R v Kopy to , above, 263. 
This dilemma was noted in Attorney-Genera/ v
 Butler [ 1953] ZLR 944,948 (SC) 
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• I 
citizenry are not so gullible that they will
 lose faith and confidence in our 
. d .. 1 b f h . . . IOJ
 
JU 1cia system ecause o sue cnt1c1sm. 
Like Justice Cory, Justice Boulden was inf
luenced by the absence of a 
comparable offence in the United States an
d its disuse in United Kingdom for 
"almost 60 years".
104 In addition, Justice Cory recorded the recommend
ations of 
the Law Commission reports in the Unite
d Kingdom, Australia and Canada. 
Australia recommended abolishing the of
fence. The United Kingdom and 
Canada recommended its retention as a narro
wer statutory offence provision.
105 
Finally, in a lengthy and joint dissenting ju
dgment delivered by Justice 
Dubin, he determined that freedom of expre
ssion, not being an absolute freedom, 
does not protect a person's conduct that con
stitutes a real, serious or substantial 
prejudice to the administration of justice. 
That is, freedom of expression does 
not encompass contempt and therefore co
ntempt is not unconstitutional. In 
reaching this conclusion he emphasised the h
istorical recognition and importance 
of freedom of expression that had been dev
eloped by the courts in conjunction 
with contempt as a device to protect the rule 
oflaw from endangerment.
106 
In Justice Dubin's opinion the majority had 
misconstrued the elements of 
the offence. In his view the offence requir
es proof of an intention to bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
107 The fact that the words may be 
capable of having this effect will be insuffi
cient. Proof of a serious risk to the 
administration of justice is also required. T
he risk or prejudice must be serious, 
real or substantial. 
108 
In conclusion, the judgments provide differ
ent rationales for concluding 
the offence of scandalising the court does n
ot complying with the Charter, and 
various solutions to achieve that goal. At t
his juncture I do not wish to embark 
on any significant analysis of the reasons g
iven other than to note two factors. 
Firstly it is unlikely that the New Zealand co
u1is would adopt the dissenting view 
103 R v Kopyto, above, 255 
104 R v Kopyto , above, 255 . 
105 R v Kopy to, above, 248-250 
106 R v Kopyto, above, 274. 
107 R v Kopyto, above, 277-278. 
108 R v Kopyto, above, 290. 
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that contempt fell outside the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression. 
A similar conclusion was reached in Solicit
or-General v Radio New Zealand 
Limited.
109 The narrow interpretative approach adopte
d by Justice Dublin to 
freedom of expression was contrary to ge
neral Canadian jurisprudence. In 
addition the broad definition of freedom of e
xpression in the Moonen decision
11 0 
would encompass freedom of expression. 
Secondly, Justice Cory and Justice 
Boulden were influenced by the jurispruden
ce of the United States, rejecting the 
more moderate commonwealth approach. 
Decisions from the United States 
would be treated with some caution in N
ew Zealand having regard to our 
differing social contexts and constitutional ar
rangements. 
V THE NEW ZEALAND BILL
 OF RIGHTS ACT AND 
SCANDALISING THE COURT 
The offence of contempt by scandalising the
 court requires the applicant, 
normally the Crown, to prove beyond reason
able doubt that the accused intended 
the act or publication (hereafter acts or p
ublications will be referred to as 
"publications") in question and that there is
 a real risk, as opposed to a remote 
possibility that the actions complained of w
ill undermine the public confidence 
in the administration of justice. o proof o
f an accused intent to undermine the 
administration of justice is required . The in
tended purpose of the publication is 
only relevant to determining the appropriate 
punishrnent.
111 
Under the BORA the courts must interpret 
and if necessary reformulate 
the common law offence so it is consistent
 with and reflects the values of the 
BORA. 11
2 To date only "sub judice contempt", the publ
ication of material that is 
likely to prejudice an accused right to a fa
ir trial, has been considered by the 
Court of Appeal and it determined that no 
reconfiguration of the common Jaw 
ffi · 
dll 3 
o ence was reqmre . 
109 
110 
111 
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Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand limit
ed [1994] l ZLR 48, 60 (HC). 
Moonen v Film and literature Board of Revie
w [2000] 2 ZLR 9, 15 para [1 5] CA. 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon limited [1978
] 1 NZLR 225 , 233 (CA) . 
Gisborne Herald Co limited v Solicitor-Gene
ra/ [ 1995] 3 ZLR 563 , 575 (CA). 
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ral, above, 575. 
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... 
The approach to determining whether scanda
lising the court complies 
with s 5 of the BORA was thought to have 
been established in Moonen.
114 
Subsequently in Moonen (No 2)
115 the Court has emphasised that other 
approaches are open. The early cases under the 
Canadian Charter, that have been 
of significance in the development of New Ze
aland BORA jurisprudence, held 
that as part of the proportionality analysis th
ere was to be the least possible 
interference with the right in question.
116 It is now accepted in Canada that the 
test is whether the law or action infringes the
 right in question "as little as is 
reasonably possible".
117 The move from 'minimal" infringement of the 
right in 
issue to "as little impairment as reasonably
 possible" is thought to have 
contributed to the Court of Appeal acknowled
gement in Moonen (No 2) that a 
more flexible approach was needed.
118 
In light of the uncertainty that surrounds the app
roach outlined in Moonen 
(No 1) l will proceed using the approach of Justic
e Richardson, as he then was, in 
MOTv Noort
119 that is as follows: 
In the end an abridging enquiry under s 5 is a m
atter of weighing 
( 1) The significance in the particular case 
of the values underlying the Bill 
of Rights Act; 
(2) The importance of the public interest in
 the intrusion on the particular 
right protected by the Bill of Rights Act; 
(3) The limits sought to be placed on the a
pplication of the Bill of Rights 
Act provision in the particular case; and 
(4) The effectiveness of the intrusion in pr
otecting the interests put 
forward to justify those limits. 
Although the Noort (and Moonen) decisions bo
th related to interpreting 
statutory provisions consistently with the BORA
, the same considerations apply 
to common Jaw provisions with one add
itional consideration. Unlike 
114 
11 5 
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117 
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inconsistent statutory prov1s10ns that remam m effec
t by virtue of s 4 of the 
BORA, the court has the additional task of detem
1ining if a non-BORA 
compliant common law power can be reformulated 
into a BORA compliant 
offence. 
Two pre-requisites must be satisfied before the s 5 BOR
A analysis can be 
undertaken. Firstly, it must be determined whether a sc
andalous publication falls 
within the affinned right of s 14 of the BORA. Tha
t is, whether freedom of 
expression is wide enough to include and protect the pu
blication in issue. If it is 
not, the scandalous publication falls outside of the pro
tection of the BORA and 
analysis under s 5 is not required. As already noted
120 it is unlikely freedom of 
expression would be narrowly construed as it was
 by the High Court in 
Solicitor-General v Radio NZ Limited.
121 The courts have given the rights in the 
BORA a generous and purposive interpretation 
122 evident in Moonen, where 
freedom of expression was considered to be as wid
e as human thought and 
imagination.
123 The broad and purposive approach 1s consistent w
ith the 
Canadian jurisprudence. Justice Cory in Kopyto conclud
ed: 
In my view, statements of a sincerely held belief on a m
atter of public interest, 
even if intemperately worded, so long as they are not
 obscene or criminally 
libbellous, should, as a general rule, come within the 
protection afforded by 
s 2(b) of the Charter. It would, I think be unfortunate i
f freedom of expression 
on matters of public interest so vital to a free and demo
cratic society was to be 
unduly restricted. The constitutional guarantee should
 be given a broad and 
liberal interpretation.
124 
The second pre-requisite is whether the limitation scan
dalising the court 
places on freedom of expression is one "prescribed by
 law". Prescribed by law 
requires the common law offence to be adequately a
ccessible and sufficiently 
precise. 125 No successful challenge has been broug
ht on the basis of this 
pre-requisite requirement. In Solicitor-General v Radio
 New Zealand Limited1
26 
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> 
• 
the High Court considered that the law of contem
pt relating to the contact and 
interrogation of jurors about their deliberations w
as clearly enough prescribed, 
although this was the first New Zealand case to ho
ld that such interference was a 
contempt.
127 In Gisborne Herald Co Limited v Solicitor-Gene
ral, 128
 a case 
involving pre-trial publicity that jeopardised a
n accused right to fair trial, 
guidelines were sought by Counsel for the appe
llant for pre-trial publication. 
The Court declined to issue any guidelines, notin
g that guidelines would be no 
more precise in the principles of contempt.
129 
Despite the discretionary nature of the offenc
e a challenge to the 
sufficiency and precision of its formulation is unl
ikely to succeed. The offence 
of contempt is broadly defined by the Court of 
Appeal in Solicitor-General v 
Radio Avon Limited and Anor
130 reflecting the myriad of forms of challenges to 
the administration of justice. The applicants b
efore the European Court of 
Human Rights in The Sunday Times v The United
 Kingdom
131 unsuccessfully 
argued that contempt was not prescribed by law
. In Kopyto, Justice Boulden 
rejected a similar submission concluding that: 
This branch of the Jaw has been clearly defined b
y both English and Canadian 
courts. A person would have no difficulty in
 ascertaining the law and 
regulating his conduct accordingly . . . The law
 of contempt of court by 
scandalising the court is, therefore, a limit prescrib
ed by Jaw. 
132 
I will proceed with the s 5 analysis on the basi
s that the contempt by 
scandalising the court is prescribed by law and 
falls within the scope of the 
statutory protection of s 14 of the BORA. 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
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ited [1996] 2 ZLR 89, 100 
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95] 3 ZLR 563 (CA). 
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i 
I 
A The Sig11ifica11ce of Freedom of Expressio
n 
The first step of the lvoort approach is to identi
fy the significance of 
freedom of expression having particular regard
 to the contempt power of 
scandalising the court. 
The right to freedom of expression has been fir
mly recognised in the 
Constitution of the United States, the Canadia
n Charter and many other 
constitutions, conventions and bill of rights. It is incor
porated into the European 
Convention of Human Rights (Article 10) 
133 and the International Convention of 
Civil and Political Rights (Article 19(2)) that wa
s ratified by New Zealand in 
1968.
134 Freedom of expression is now incorporated into s 
14 of the BORA and 
reads: 
Section 14: Freedom of Expression - everyone 
has the right to freedom of 
expression including freedom to seek, receive a
nd impart information and 
opinions of any kind and any form. 
The fundamental value and importance of freedo
m of expression in a 
democratic society has been repeatedly emphasise
d by the courts. It has been 
described as "indispensable to the democratic p
rocess" and "essential to the 
enlightenment of a free people and in restraining
 those who wield power".
135 
While recognising the fundamental value of freedo
m of expression it has equally 
been acknowledged by the courts that freedom of
 expression is not an absolute 
right. By virtue of s 5 of the BORA rights affir
med in the BORA, including 
freedom of expression, are expressly subject to re
asonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and d
emocratic society.
136 
The administration of justice plays a crucial role in
 a democratic society. 
A system of justice is the forum not only for the r
evolution of disputes between 
133 
134 
135 
136 
European Convention of Human Rights http://www
/echr.coe.int (last accessed 30 
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ted States Supreme Court, Justice 
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29 
the public, but the public and the state.
137 As a consequence of the court's 
fundamental role in democracy it has long been re
cognised that there is a public 
interest in the administration of justice being sub
ject to scrutiny and criticism, 
and such scrutiny should only be restricted where c
ircumstances necessitate it.
138 
The Court of Appeal in Solicitor-General v Radio Av
on and Another stated: 
139 
The courts in New Zealand and in the United King
dom, completely recognise 
the importance of freedom of speech in relation 
to their work provided that 
criticism is put forward fairly and honestly for a 
legitimate purpose and not 
for the purpose of injuring our system of justice. 
The public also has an equal and significant 
interest m those who 
administer the justice system. Judges as persons 
(or courts as institutions) are 
entitled to no greater immunity from criticis
m than other persons (or 
institutions).
140 The importance of the public being able to scrutini
ze the actions 
of the judiciary must be particularly significant w
here judges hold office until 
retirement, subject to good behaviour, with lim
ited or no check on their 
powers.
141 
The significance of freedom of expression in a dem
ocratic society cannot 
be overstated. Nor can the importance of public s
crutiny of a crucial institution 
such as the administration of justice. Both are of
 significant importance to any 
democratic society. In conclusion, while freed
om of expression is not an 
absolute right, limitations upon it that affect the 
public's ability to express its 
views about a fundamental institution should only 
be contemplated if an equally 
important and fundamental public interest requires 
it. 
B The Importance of the Objective of Scandal
ising the Court 
The second step in the Noor! approach 
142 requires the importance of the 
public interest that is the basis for the intrusion 
and limitation of freedom of 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4t") 213 , 227 Cory JA . 
Attorney-General v Butler [ 1953] ZLR 944, 946 (S
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Honourable Margaret H Marshall "Dangerous Talk
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Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law" (2002
) 24 Sydney LR 445, 462-463. 
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expression to be examined. If the objective is not s
ufficiently important to 
warrant a limitation of the right the limitation is n
ot demonstratably justifiable. 
In Kopyto Justice Cory accepted that the o
bjective of protecting the 
administration of justice was of sufficient import
ance to warrant overriding a 
constitutionally protected right or freedom.
143 Justice Boulden expressed the 
contrary opinion. In Justice Boulden's opinion 
public confidence would not 
crumble following a scandalous publication, notin
g that there was no empirical 
evidence that supported the alleged consequence. 
In Justice Boulden's opinion 
scandalising the court was not a justifiable limitati
on on freedom of expression, 
the alleged consequences of the publication being
 purely speculative.
144 If the 
effect of the publication does not result in the harm
 the offence seeks to protect 
there can be not public interest in the offence. In
 short, if there is no problem 
there is not public interest. 
Considering firstly Justice Holden's position, it is 
my view that the New 
Zealand courts would not adopt the scepticism Ju
stice Boulden expressed and 
will continue to conclude that scandalous publi
cations risk undennining the 
public's confidence in the administration of justic
e. The absence of empirical 
evidence to support the "cause and effect" rati
onale underlying the law of 
contempt has been referred to in ew Zealand in
 pre-trial publicity contempt 
cases. 145 The Law Commission has undertaken 
some analysis of the media's 
impact on jurors and concluded that the research 
shows the impact is minimal 
and jurors are well capable of putting media cover
age to one side. The research 
result is interpreted as indicating the correct balan
ce has been struck. It has not 
been viewed as a basis for liberalising present restri
ctions . 
146 
New Zealand cou1is have traditionally adopted a ca
utious approach to the 
value judgments the law of contempt requires . Th
e influence of precedent and 
caution will continue until reliable empirical data 
supports a contrary approach . 
An additional factor influencing the scepticism exp
ressed in Kopyto included the 
143 
144 
145 
146 
R v Kopy to (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 213, 239 Cory JA. 
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American approach.
147 The United States veered away sharply from 
the 
Commonwealth law with the seminal case of Bridg
es v California.
148 The "clear 
and present danger test" gave the American public
 a virtually unseated freedom 
to criticise its judiciary.
149 The American right to criticise the administration 
of 
justice is frequently and vehemently invoked, but i
t cannot be said that chaos has 
resulted. In general, Americans live in a "orderly
 society" in which people 
follow the rules of the court as matter of course. 
1 so 
The social experience of the United States is unlik
ely to find favour with 
the New Zealand courts. Our courts have empha
sised that the evaluation and 
balancing of fundamental principles and freedoms 
must in the end be assessed in 
a local context.
151 This point was again emphasised in the majority ju
dgment of 
the Court of Appeal in Lange v Atkinson: 
152 
The leading decision [from other jurisdictions] jus
t reviewed do not present a 
simple picture. The reflect the proposition that how
ever fundamental freedom 
of expression may be in the culture, law and pol
itics of the jurisdictions in 
issue will be given varying degrees of importance 
when it collides with other 
rights and interests. 
An obvious example in a contempt context of wh
at might occur if New 
Zealand courts too readily adopted the appro
ach of other jurisdictions, 
disregarding New Zealand's social context, are 
the necessity for "procedural 
devices" that are employed in the criminal justice
 process in the United States 
and Canada.
153 Devices such as sequestering of jurors for the dur
ation of trial 
and questioning potential jurors are the necess
ary consequences of giving 
primacy to freedom of expression over an accus
ed right to a fair trial.
154 A 
similar result would be quite contrary to New Ze
aland's social context and a 
marked departure from present day practices. The
 Chief Justice in the Woman's 
147 
148 
149 
150 
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153 
154 
R v Kopyto , above, 255, Houlden JA . 
Bridges v California ( 1941) 314 US 252. 
Hon Margaret H Marshall "Dangerous Talking, Dan
gerous Silence: Free Speech, 
Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law" (2002
) 24 Sydney Law Review, 455 , 459 . 
Hon Stephen G Breyer "Judicial Independence in U
nited States" ( 1996) 40 St Louis U 
LJ 989, 996. 
Gisborne Herald Co limited v Solicitor-General [19
95] 3 ZLR 563, 575 (CA). 
Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 NZLR 424, 459 (CA). 
Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp 94 CCC (3
d) 289. 
Keith Mason QC "Australia and the World" (1995)
 69 ALJ 157, 158. 
32 
Weekly case expressed a view that where there is a 
realistic risk of prejudice to a 
trial, a publication ban is preferable to the "unce
rtainties of counter measures 
available".
155 
Having determined that Justice Houlden's opinion 
would not find favour 
in New Zealand the objective and rationality of s
candalizing the court and the 
public interest in those factors requires considera
tion. The Hong Kong High 
Court summarized the objective and rationality 
of scandalising the court as 
follows: 
A civilised conununity cannot survive without 
efficient machinery for the 
enforcement of its laws. The task of enforcing th
ose laws falls on the courts, 
and on the judges who preside over them. It has a
lways been regarded as vital 
to the rule of law for respect for the judiciary for 
the maintained and for their 
dignity to be upheld. If it were otherwise, 
public confidence in the 
administration of justice would be undermined, a
nd the law itself would fall 
into disrepute. 
156 
Emphasising the court's ability to protect itself f
rom attacks that may 
bring it into disrepute, and in tum undermine the r
ule of law, were expressed in 
Borrie and Lowe's Law of Contempt: 
The necessity for this branch of contempt lies in
 the idea that without well 
regulated laws a civilised community cannot surv
ive. It is therefore thought 
important to retain the respect and dignity of the c
ourt and its officers, whose 
task it is to uphold and enforce the law, because w
ithout such respect, public 
faith in the administration of justice would be w1
dermined and the law itself 
would fall into disrepute. 
157 
Similar sentiments appear m other authorities.
158 Democracy 1s a 
fundamental value of New Zealand society found
ed on the rnle of law. The 
155 
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courts play an important role in any democratic societ
y. 159 One the fundamental 
functions of the courts are to uphold the rule of Jaw
 and resolve disputes. If 
public confidence in the administration of justice is u
ndennined, the standard of 
conduct of all those who may have business before
 the court is likely to be 
weakened. Recourse to other unlawful methods o
f resolving disputes may 
result.
160 The courts also uphold fundamental rights. The valu
e of freedom of 
expression can only be reinforced and maintained 
through a respected and 
impartial system of justice. As can be seen from the c
ase law it is the courts that 
have interpreted and developed the importance o
f freedom of expression. 
Without a respected justice system, all freedom
s, including freedom of 
expression, are vulnerable.
161 In my view the importance of maintaining the 
integrity and impartiality of the third branch of New
 Zealand's constitutional 
configuration is a sufficiently important objective to w
arrant some limitation on 
freedom of expression. 
C The Limitatio11s 011 Freedom of Expressio11 (t
he proportio11ality test) 
The third step in the Noort approach is to identify the 
limits scandalising 
the court seeks to place on freedom of expression and
 to consider if those limits 
are a "proportional" response to the objective of prote
cting the administration of 
justice from being brought into dispute in the eyes of 
the public. In my view the 
limits scandalising the court places upon freedom of ex
pression is minimal. This 
paper has already highlighted 
162 that the public's ability to criticise the 
administration of justice is not prohibited by this con
tempt. Rather criticism is 
limited to criticism that is for a legitimate purpose. As
 Lord Russell CJ said in R 
G 
163 
V ray: 
159 
160 
16 1 
162 
163 
Judges and courts are alike open to criticism and if reas
onable argument or expostulation 
is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or 
the public good, no court could or 
would treat that as contempt of court 
R v Kopy to 47 DLR (4th) 213,227 Cory JA . 
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94) ZLJ 442,443 . 
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R v Gray [ 1900) 2 QB 36,40. 
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The fact there has only been three successful New Zea
land prosecutions 
for scandalising the court after trial 
164 or unrelated to any particular proceedings 
is evidence in itself that this power of contempt is rar
ely invoked and reserved 
for the most extreme cases. It is unlikely that m
ere use of vitriolic and 
intemperate language will of itself be sufficient for co
ntempt proceedings to be 
brought. Many examples could be put forward of int
emperate criticism of the 
administration of justice, which if they were to res
ult in an application for 
committal of contempt would draw a negative public r
esponse and criticism that 
the power of contempt was being abused to protect th
ose whom wield it. The 
limit of the offence and its impact upon freedom of exp
ression is tempered by the 
"real risk" test. Real risk must be assessed havi
ng regard to all of the 
circumstances of the publication.
165 Relevant factors include the statements 
published, the timing of their publication, and the size
 of the audience reached, 
the likely nature, impact and duration of their infl
uence. 1
66 Another factor 
emphasised by the High Court in Solicitor-General v R
adio New Zealand Ltd 
167 
is the climate of the times and the prevailing social env
ironment. The court has 
not been unrealistic to recognise that the justice system
 could readily withstand 
the occasional aberration when the respect for the au
thority, conventions and 
institutions of the justice system are strong.
168 The relevance of considering the 
circumstances surrounding the publication was also
 emphasised by Justice 
G d 
· V 169 oo man m 1\.opyto. 
While it is not possible to view a given form of words 
in isolation and to 
say that it will either invariably amount to a contempt o
r that it will never do so, 
the real risk test and the requirement to have regard to
 the circumstances of the 
publication will result in minimal encroachment upon 
of freedom of expression. 
The expressions of a disgruntled litigant are unlikely
 to invoke the contempt 
power. Regard would be had to the reader's common s
ense to appreciate that the 
comments are those of a disgruntled litigant. Similarly
 the one off spontaneous 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
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remarks are likely to be \'ie\\'ed as ill-concei\'ed rema
rks reflecting more poorly 
on the speaker than undermining the administration of j
ustice. 
It has been suggested that some of the most trencha
nt criticism comes 
from within the justices stem itself. In the most famous ex
ample is that of Lord 
Denning in his dissenting judgment in Candler , . Cran
e, Christmas and Co
170 
when he accused his colleagues of being ''timorous sou
ls' 171 \\'hich, in "ordinary 
parlance, will imply cowardice and lack of imagination
". Such instances are rare 
and immune from punishment by \'irtue of the crit
icisms arising during the 
performance of the judicial function . uch examples
 are not e\'idence that the 
administration of justice is being undermined from w
ithin . The public \\'Ould 
regard the criticism as ha\'ing being measured and justi
fied. uch criticism could 
also be viewed by the public as constituting a \'ind
ication of the system of 
justice, not its undoing.
1
-
2 
A further consideration as to the limits contempt impo
ses is \\'hether the 
limits are necessary given the other possible legal a
venues that the judiciar 
could utilise to seek redress such as bringing defamatio
n or proceedings based on 
the tort of libel. Both defamation and personal libel a
re personal and individual 
remedies not designed to protect group or official repre
sentations that the offence 
of scandalising the court is concerned \\'ith . n The Engl
ish Law Commission 
re\'iew of the laws of contempt, carried out in the ea
rl 1970' s known as the 
Phillimore Report
1
- -l concluded that one of the reasons scandalising the
 court 
should remain, as an offence is the lack of prote
ction the law otherwise 
affords .1r In addition there is a general reluctance amon
gst the judiciary to 
commence proceedings. It is not a means that ?\e\\' 
Zealand Judges would 
readily employ. It also places upon the shoulders of th
e judiciary the function of 
personally protecting the s stem when the protection 
and response should come 
from the system itself. 
1-, ·-
1,3 
114 
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Finally, the minimal limits scandalising the court plac
es on freedom of 
expression only affects those publications that don't as
sist the public debate and 
scrutiny of a fundamental public institution. Scand
alous remarks are only 
tenuously related to the public interest of protecting fre
edom of expression about 
such institutions. False and injurious statements do 
not enhance change and 
development. To the contrary they are detrimental in th
eir effect. The European 
Court of Human Rights recognised the limited contrib
ution of a publication in 
issue to public debate when it stated, "[the applicants
] did nothing to enhance 
protection accorded to the expression of political opinio
ns". 176 
D The Effectiveness of Scandalising the Court (Ra
tionality Test) 
The final step in the Noort approach is consideration of w
hether the 
offence is a rational response to the need to protect the a
dministration of justice. 
Does it limit freedom of expression in an appropriate an
d effective way? Both 
Justice Cory and Justice Goodman concluded that the of
fence was not rationally 
connected to its objectives and re-constituted the offenc
e, in different ways. In 
this section I will consider whether the actus reus and th
e mens rea of the 
offence as presently defined is rationally connected to it
s objective or whether 
the elements of the offence require reformulation. 
1 Actus reus: clear and present danger v real risk 
test 
Justice Cory and Justice Goodman both concluded that
 the actus reus for 
scandalising the court was insufficient for the offence to
 be a rational response to 
protecting the administration of justice. Justice Goodm
an required proof that the 
administration of justice had been brought into disreput
e and both required proof 
of a "clear and present danger" 
177 to the administration of justice. In my view 
the "real risk" test is rationally connected to the object
ive of maintaining public 
confidence in the administration of justice and no ad
ditional proof of harm is 
required. 
176 
177 
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Justice Cory conclusion was based upon an inaccurate analysi
s of the 
actus reus of the offence. He proceeded upon the basis that the offe
nce assumed 
that the publication in issue would bring the court into contem
pt or lower its 
authority in the eyes of the public.
178 This premise is not supported by the 
authorities
179 and conflicts with the existing test as outlined by Justic
e 
Goodman.
180 On the other hand Justice Goodman simply concluded that mor
e 
proof was necessary. The "clear and present danger" test that th
ey both adopted 
has not been followed in subsequent Canadian contempt 
cases. Justice 
Dublin's
181 test that serious risk to the administration of justice as perceived 
by a 
reasonable person in the community, has been applied.
182 
Although the basic premise of Justice Cory's determination is in
accurate 
and Justice Goodman's determination is a subjective value judg
ment, the issue 
still remains as to whether the clear and present danger test or t
he real risk test 
best satisfies that rationality of the offence when compared with i
ts objective. 
The objective of the offence of scandalising the court is the prote
ction of 
the administration of justice from disrepute caused by a 
loss of public 
confidence. It is the maintenance of public confidence in a system
 of justice that 
scandalising the court seeks to protect. Requiring proof of cl
ear and present 
danger to the administration of justice requires proof that a
 loss of public 
confidence has already occurred. The danger to the administratio
n of justice can 
only be "present" if public confidence has already being underm
ined or eroded 
by the publication in issue. The clear and present danger test 
emphasises the 
effects caused by the publication on the administration of justic
e at the cost of 
protecting the confidence of the public. If clear and present dange
r were required 
the offence would be weighed towards "punishment" for the
 loss of public 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
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confidence, not the prevention of the confidence of the publ
ic from being 
impaired. 
Contempt has traditionally focused upon the prevention of harm
. For 
example maintaining the accused right to a fair trial, ensuring the
 Judiciary has 
the ability to make impartial judgments, the protection of jurors 
from unlawful 
influence or disturbance. If the actus reus of the offence was "pun
ishment 
focused" the prevention of harm that the scandalising the court g
uards against, 
would be lost. In my view the real risk test is the appropriate balan
ce between 
the prevention of harm to the administration of justice an
d freedom of 
expression. 
One criticism of the real risk test is that the threshold does not ta
ke into 
account the reality that most contempt proceedings are brought af
ter publication 
and by which time the negative effects of the publication upon the
 administration 
of justice, if any, should have occurred and be obvious. If no disrepute h
as been 
caused to the administration of justice then the fact there may have
 been the risk, 
however real, of disrepute is irrelevant. As noted in respons
e to a similar 
submission made to the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Haser a
nd Kotabi Pty 
Ltd183 the practical reality of assessing whether the reputation of 
the courts had 
been diminished amongst those members of the public that 
had read the 
publication would be impossible. The real risk test, like the cle
ar and present 
danger test, is a value judgrnent by the judiciary. Further the purp
ose of the test 
is to prevent the anticipated disruption that would result from the
 loss of public 
confidence in the administration of justice and to ensure that th
ere are timely 
reminders of the acceptable boundaries. The ew Zealand Co
urt of Appeal 
noted the growing dangers of direct actions against the administra
tion of justice 
in Solicitor-General v Radio Avon and Another.
184 So too did Justice Eames in 
the Supreme Court of Victoria who stated: 
183 
184 
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... Organised and quite sophisticated campaigns against the integrity o
f the 
courts, if unchecked, may prove very effective in damaging the reputatio
ns of 
the courts . 
185 
In my view, the real risk test is rationally connected with the objective of
 
the offence. The four examples of it being invoked in New Zealand 
to date 
suggests it is not readily resorted to and will only employed for extreme ca
ses. 
2 Mens rea - is proof of the intended consequences of the publication 
required? 
Justice Cory determined that an additional mens rea element was also 
necessary for the offence to be Charter compliant. He recommended pro
of that 
an accused intended to cause disrepute to the administration of justice 
or was 
reckless, despite the forseeability of that consequence, was necessary. 
While 
only devoting one short paragraph to the proposed additional mens rea ele
ment, 
it was Justice Cory's view this was a "reasonable requirement" of the Cro
wn, the 
absence of which would result in an arbitrary standard.
186 I agree with Justice 
Cory that proof of the accused blameworthy state of mind is necess
ary for 
scandalising the court to be a justifiable limitation on freedom of expr
ession. 
Evidence of specific intent or recklessness despite foreseeable consequenc
es will 
suffice. 
To date New Zealand has resisted all attempts to introduce an additional 
intentional element. The courts have traditionally adopted the response 
that the 
importance of the objective of the offence justifies, what in my view is, 
a lower 
standard of proof.
187 Neither the United Kingdom nor Australia requires proof of 
an accused intent, or recklessness, to undem1ine the administration of jus
tice. 188
 
Canadian cases
189 since Kopyto have adopted Justice Cory's re-formulation of 
the mens rea element, requiring proof of direct intent or recklessness. The
 only 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
R v Haser and Kotabi Pty limited, above, para 228 . 
R v Kopyto (1987) 47 DLR (4th) 21 3, 240 Cory JA. 
Solicitor-Genera/ v Radio Avon limited and Another [1978] 1 ZLR 225 , 2
33 (CA) . 
R v Editor of New Statesman, ex p DPP ( 1928) 44 TLR 301 ,303 Lord Hewa
rd CJ; 
A ttomey-Ceneral of New South Wales v Mundey [ 1972] 2 SWLR 887, 911
-2, 
Hope JA 
R v Glasner (1994) 93 CCC (3d) 226, 244 (Ont CA) Laskin JA; R v Prefont
ain e [2002] 
Al o 1364 para 98 (Alberta QB) Moreau J. 
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New Zealand contempt case to have given some consideration to whether an 
additional mens rea element should be required to ensure the offence was not an 
unjustifiable infringement of freedom of expression under the BORA is Duff v 
Communicado Limited. 
19° Communicado had brought proceedings to commit 
the author Alan Duff for contempt of court for statements he had made on the 
radio and television that were viewed as an endeavour to apply public pressure 
on Communicado to settle Mr Duffs civil claim against the company. Justice 
Blanchard hesitated as to whether the fact contempt could be committed without 
"an intention to interfere with the due administration of justice" as an undue 
restriction on freedom of expression. In Justice Blanchard's view the standard of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt of "real risk" ensured that justifiable criticisms of 
the administration of justice were not stifled and was a sufficient safeguard 
against unjustifiable limitations on freedom of expression. Further, proof of 
whether an accused intended the consequences was necessary before penalty was 
imposed. Justice Blanchard was of the view that "marking" (but not necessarily 
punishing) serious interferences with the administration of justice outweighed the 
. h fr d f . 19 1 ng t to ee om o expression. 
In my view the absence of an additional mens rea requirement is contrary 
to the fundamentals of criminal law that contempt, as the sole surviving common 
law offence, is part of. The primary function of criminal law is to condemn and 
punish for wrongdoing. If a person is not blameworthy for the wrong done, the 
censure of the criminal law is not appropriate - and if it is inflicted, the public 
will tend to think that it is because the person is to blame.
192 The effectiveness of 
criminal law as a tool of social control would be diminished if persons who are 
not culpable of the prohibited act were convicted of the wrongdoing.
193 In a 
modem world where freedom of expression is highly valued and to be expected 
and encouraged of public institutions, it is likely that more social distrust would 
be caused by a conviction for contempt where no punishment is imposed for lack 
of intent, than the publication itself. Scandalising the court was not developed 
190 
19 1 
192 
193 
Duff v Communicado limited [ 1996] 2 ZLR 98 (HC). 
Dujfv Communicado Limited, above, 101 . 
A p Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal law (Brookers, 
Wellington, 1998) 12 . 
Brookbanks, above, 12. 
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nor is it maintained to "mark" incursions caused by unlawful publications, but to 
punish those who are responsible for doing so. 
Contempt by virtue of its summary process and objective is a senous 
criminal offence. In contrast to all other serious criminal offences no specific 
intent to cause the prohibited outcome as required. The public's confidence in 
the administration of justice is reliant upon a number of factors not only the 
prevention of the integrity of system that is placed at risk by scandalous 
publications. The public's confidence will also be undermined if the public 
perceives that those who administer the system do not do so by the consistent 
application of the principles of criminal law. Scandalising the court by its label 
wrongly suggests to the public that it exists to shield the judiciary and the judicial 
system from criticism.
194 To convict an accused of a serious crime that was not 
intended, that to the public "appears" to be for the benefit of those who 
administer the system, is likely to undermine public confidence that the criminal 
justice is being consistently dispensed. A conviction in the absence of intent 
would suggest to the public that the 'system" was protecting itself for self 
interest purposes. 
Finally, proof of "real risk" beyond reasonable doubt is a high and 
difficult burden to discharge in social circumstances where a much greater 
degree of tolerance to attacks upon the administration of justice is evident. The 
difficulties of proving "real risk" are illustrated by the unsuccessful application 
by the Solicitor-General for contempt following a media publication during a 
murder trial that had resulted in the trial Judge aborting the trial.
195 The burden 
of real risk was not simply satisfied by the trial been aborted.
196 Increased 
tolerance to criticism of the judiciary makes it unlikely that the cartoon in 
Blomfield case 197 would result in contempt proceedings today. No proceedings 
were brought for example when the Daily Mirror responded to the Spycatcher 
injunction in 1987 by publishing a photograph of the Law Lords below the 
194 
195 
196 
197 
Solicitor-General v Radio Avon and Another [ 1978] I ZLR 225, 229 (CA). 
Solicitor-General v TVJ Network Services Ltd & TVNZ, I-IC, Christchurch, M 520/96, 
8 April 1997, Eichelbaum CJ and !Iansen J. 
John McGrath QC "Contempt and The Media : Constitutional Safeguard or State 
Censorship" (1998) ZLR 371,378. 
Refer pages 14-15 above. 
42 
headline "You Fools!".
198 The high burden of proof coupled with the general 
restraint upon invoking the court's powers of contempt, particularly those 
relating to scandalising, that are reserved for urgent and flagrant cases 
199 makes it 
difficult to envisage that a serious interference with the administration of justice 
could occur inadvertently.
200 In my view ' real risk" will only be proved where 
there is the accompanying intent, albeit reckless disregard to the foreseeable 
consequences. In the recent cases of scandalising the cou1i, outlined in section 
II(A) of this paper,
20 1 intent, although not required to be proved, could have been 
inferred from the facts of each case. In Oriental Press Group
202 there was a 
sustained course of conduct by the newspaper over a substantial period of time 
entailing extreme and abusive language that could only have been designed to 
harass intimidate and abuse tribunal members and Judges. The numerous 
publications had resulted in correspondence to the newspaper from members of 
the public that evidenced that the newspapers campaign to undermine the 
administration of justice was having that effect. On the facts of the case it 
would have been open to the Hong Kong High Court, if required, to have 
inferred that the editor and publishers had intended to bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. In the Australian case Fitzgibbons v Barker
203 and the 
Privy Council decision of Ahnee v DPP
204 intent could also have been inferred 
from the extremity of the impropriety alleged in each publication and the blatant 
misstatements of material non-contestable facts. These cases illustrate that "real 
risk" is only likely to be found in extreme cases where an intent to undermine the 
administration of justice could also be inferred from the facts of the case. As the 
seriousness of the "real risk" to the administration of justice has increased it is 
unlikely that the intent could not be inferred from the publication in issue. 
198 
199 
200 
20 1 
202 
203 
204 
Nigel Lowe and Brenda Sufrin Th e law of Contempt (3 'd ed, Butterworths, London, 
1996) 343. 
Bad,y v DPP of Mauritius [ 1983] 2 AC 297, 303-304 ; John Burrows and rsula Cheer 
Media Law in ew Zealand (4
1
" Edition, Oxford Uni versity Press, Auckland, 1999) 273 
and 278. 
Duff v Communicado limited, above, I O l. 
Refer pages 7-10 above. 
Secreta,y for Justice v Oriental Press Croup limited and Ors [1998] 2 HKC 627. 
Fitzgibbon v Barker ( 1992) 111 FLR 19 (Austral Fam Ct) . 
A/111ee v DPP [1999] 2 AC 294 (PC). 
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Two criticism of an additional mens rea requirement might be that the 
standard of proof that is more difficutt205 thereby placing at risk the 
administration of justice if proof of the offence becomes unattainable. While an 
initial concern it is more likely that the difficulties of proving "real risk" in 
today's social climate is the real limitation. Further, while convictions may be 
more achievable without proof of an additional intent, the absence of any penalty 
imposed due to the lack of an accused intent is of itself an unsatisfying result. A 
second criticism may be that the absence of intent from those areas of contempt 
that fall within the strict liability offence provisions under the United Kingdom 
Contempt of Courts Act 1981 reflect the importance of the objective of the 
offence that has been the basis of resisting an additional mens rea requirement to 
date. In my view little can be inferred from the statute that does not cover 
scandalising the court. In addition the impact of the United Kingdom Human 
Rights Act 1998 is yet to be determined. 
VI CONCLUSION - IS SCANDALISING THE COURT A JUSTIFIABLE 
LIMITATION 
While the courts will exhibit some caution to decisions from overseas 
jurisdictions given the need to consider the local contemporary circumstances 
when detern1ining contempt proceedings, ew Zealand courts will also not want 
to adopt an approach that would be entirely contrary to other jurisdictions that 
New Zealand normally has regard to. Kopyto was detem1ined at a time when the 
power of contempt for scandalous publications had not recently been invoked. 
As Justice Cory and Justice Boulden both noted, "The United Kingdom, 
although recognising the existence of the offence, has not registered a conviction 
for over 60 years".
206 
Since Kopyto New Zealand has enacted the BORA and the United 
Kingdom the Human Rights Act 1988 . Scandalising the court in the intervening 
15 years since Kopyto has continued to invoked periodically. Although no 
successful prosecution in the United Kingdom has been brought, the Privy 
205 
206 
R v Kopy to (1987) 47 DLR (41h) 213,241 , Cory JA . 
R v Kopy to, above, 238 Cory JA, 255 Boulden JA. 
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Council has continued to uphold the offence. 207 The Australian Supreme Court 
of Victoria found an accuseri guilty in November 2001 for contempt for 
publishing a scandalous book that was unrelated to any proceedings.
208 
Contempt proceedings for scandalous remarks in the face of the court were 
brought before the Canadian Alberta Court of Queens Bench in November 
2002. 209 Finally, the Hong Kong High Court for the first time entered 
convictions for scandalising the court, post-trial, in 1998.
210 
No careless involvement of scandalous contempt has come before the 
European Court of Human Rights. The relevance of European convention 
jurisprudence in New Zealand is emphasised in Lange v Atkinson.
211 In Prager 
and Oberschlick v Austria212 the European Court considered whether the 
applicant's conviction for defaming a judge in a periodical was a violation of 
their right to freedom of expression, contrary to Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The European Court concluded the publication in 
issue had not only damaged the judge's reputation but also undermined public 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as a whole.
2 13 The European Couri 
held that there had been no violation of Article 10, that the limitation of the 
applicant's freedom of expression was "necessary in a democratic society". Of 
significance is the following passage in the judgment: 
207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
2 12 
213 
214 
Regard must, however, be had to the special role of the judiciary in society. 
As the guarantor of justice, a fundamental value in a law-governed tate, it 
must enjoy public confidence if it is to be successful in carrying out its duties . 
It may therefore prove necessary to protect such confidence against 
destructive attacks that are essentially unfounded, especially in view of the 
fact that judges who have been criticised are subject to a duty of discretion 
that precludes them from replying.
2 14 
Ahnee v DPP [1999] 2 AC 294. 
R v Haser and Kotabi Pty Limited [200 I] VSC 443. 
R v Prefontaine [2002] AJ o 134. 
The Secretary for Justice v The Oriental Press Croup Limited and Others [ 1998] 2 HKC 
627. 
Lange v Atkinson [ 1998] 3 ZLR 424, 457 (CA). 
Prager and Obersch/ick v Austria ( 1995) 21 EHRR I. 
Prager and Obersch/ick v Austria, above, 20 para [36]. 
Prager and Obersch/ick v Austria, above, 20 para [34]. 
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The above recent cases illustrate that New Zealand would not be on its 
own if it were to continue to r~ly upon the contempt powers of scandalising the 
court. 
Scandalising the court, as archaic as it may sound, 1s an important 
safeguard in protecting a fundamental public institutions. The appropriate 
balance needs to be struck between the competing ideals of freedom of 
expression and protecting the administration of justice from falling into disrepute 
in the eyes of the public. Both ideals are fundamental to a democratic society. If 
the balance were to shift too far in favour of the offence the public confidence 
that it seeks to protect would be undermined by the impression that the courts 
were adopting a "self preserving" approach. On the other hand, the need for 
there to be some reasonable means for preventing public confidence being lost by 
publications that make no contribution to the public debate, while not stifling 
debate about the administration of justice, must be achieved. 
In my view the balance is struck by an offence that is only invoked in the 
most serious of cases that requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of not only 
intent to publish, but also intent ( direct or reckless disregard) that the publication 
would undermine public confidence. In addition there must be a real risk that the 
publication will result in the administration of justice being brought into 
disrepute. The test is sufficiently high in terms of the standard of proof and the 
evidence required that the encroachment on the affirmed right of freedom of 
expression will be minimal and reserved for only those few very cases where the 
circumstances of the publication call for action to be taken. The addition of a 
further element of intent will enhance the acceptability of the offence and prevent 
the public perception that the offence is one of self-interest that would of itself 
undermine public confidence. The additional intent requirement is unlikely to be 
burdensome upon the applicant and will act as a check as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence of "real risk" for the proceedings to be brought. The history 
of the offence in New Zealand of itself illustrates that a cautious conservative 
approach has been traditionally adopted by the Law Officers responsible for 
initiating committal proceedings and by the Courts in determining them . This 
46 
history of itself illustrates freedom of expression will not readily be limited in 
New Zealand. 
Kopyto will be relevant to a s 5 BORA analysis of the offence of 
scandalising the court, but given the passage of time since Kopyto, the continued 
recognition of the offence in various jurisdictions and need for an evaluation of 
the elements of the offence from a local contemporary perspective it is unlikely 
that the various rationales for re-fonnulation of the offence would be followed in 
New Zealand, expect of the adopting of an additional mens rea element of intent. 
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